Between 1905 and 1945, 31 states in the Untied States and 2 provinces in Canada enacted sterilization legislation. Over 70 statutes and amendments were enacted to guide, oversee and regulate sterilization practice, while over 24 distinct conditions were offered as grounds for sterilization. Although excellent legal, historical, and philosophical scholarship has investigated the motivations, causes and consequences of this legislation, little work has been done to explicitly systematic analyse the language used in sterilization legislation. This brief study attempts to fill (...) some of the gap by attending to a number of questions that arise in the context of sterilization legislation. Five questions are addressed: Are there any patterns to the eugenic language in sterilization legislation? Does the eugenic sterilization language reflect what is found on other eugenic lists? What can sterilization language tell us about the mechanics of eugenics? What can sterilization legislation reveal about the role of feeble-mindedness or mental deficiency in eugenic history? And finally, what might sterilization language tell us about eugenic thought more generally? In answering these questions, we look to add one more piece to the puzzle that is eugenic history in North America. (shrink)

Kant distinguishes between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ citizens and holds that only the former are civilly self-sufficient and possess rights of political participation. Such rights are important, since for Kant state institutions are a necessary condition for individual freedom. Thus, only active citizens are entitled to contribute to a necessary condition for the freedom of each. I argue that Kant attributes civil self-sufficiency to those who are not under the authority of any private individual for their survival. This reading is more (...) textually grounded than the dominant reading, which understands civil self-sufficiency in terms of economic relations alone. I further argue that Kant was interested in relations of authority because he was concerned to eliminate certain forms of corruption. This indicates that Kant’s contested distinction between active and passive citizens was a response to a key problem of any account of public lawgiving. (shrink)

This article discusses five attempts at justifying the provision of welfare on Kantian grounds. I argue that none of the five proposals is satisfactory. Each faces a serious challenge on textual or systematic grounds. The conclusion to draw from this is not that a Kantian cannot defend the provision of welfare. Rather, the conclusion to draw is that the task of defending the provision of welfare on Kantian grounds is a difficult one whose success we should not take for granted.

In Kantian ethics, do we wrong someone when our use of them requires that they violate a duty to self, even when they have consented to that use? In this paper, I answer this question in the negative. Consent that constitutes a violation of a duty to self is impermissible yet normatively transformative. But it also matters how consent was obtained. For example, it matters whether consent is solicited or unsolicited, whether our action amounts to complicity with the violation, and (...) how the act of consent is shaped by the broader contours of the relationship the parties stand in to each other. In Kantian terms, we might fail in our duties of respect to others even when our interactions with them are consensual. So many, but not all, consensual interactions in which one person violates a duty to self are also instances in which they are interpersonally wronged. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Jakob Huber's Kant's Grounded Cosmopolitanism: Original Common Possession and the Right to Visit sets out a rich and novel project of Kant interpretation and defence. Huber does well to wed argumen...

There has often been an adversarial relationship between the “search for the historical Jesus” and the Church. But Christian belief and practice must be correctly related to Jesus, so the search is important to Christianity. It is argued that the New Testament picture of Jesus is basically accurate and reliable. Paul’s statements about Jesus are examined. It is significant that Mark’s picture of Jesus was convincing to Matthew and Luke. Jesus’ self-understanding in the Gospels is examined, and it is (...) argued that he implicitly claimed to be divine. (shrink)

The argument is that Davies is irresponsible to take a religious approach to interferon treatment.

In the mid-twentieth century, the identity of those who oversaw the UK electricity grid tentatively and slowly began to shift from those who joined the electricity industry directly from secondary school to a university-educated elite with a higher level of technical education. At the same time, electricity infrastructure became increasingly centralised, leading to the creation of a national grid in 1938, meaning that control of electricity became concentrated in the hands of an ever-smaller group and increasing the stakes in debates (...) over strategy. By using the case studies of power engineer Paul Schiller and mathematician Maurice Davies, this paper traces how the boundaries of what mathematics could or could not be used for were renegotiated between factions within the UK electricity industry. Schiller unsuccessfully attempted to use mathematics, including the authority of academic mathematicians, to reinforce controversial arguments about the strategic direction of the industry in the 1940s. Such arguments failed to resonate with a class of, as Schiller put it, “practical men” that still held considerable influence. Davies on the other hand was employed by the industry in the 1950s to improve efficiency, and was able to implement lasting measures in this effort by using the weather to forecast electricity demand, and successfully defended the usefulness of his work in the 1970s against colleagues who felt that forecasting could be done better with mathematical models without weather inputs. The contrast between these two stories shows how the influence of mathematical thinking was contingent upon existing power dynamics, and reinforce how the history of mathematics should be socially embedded. (shrink)

Two options are ‘incommensurate’ when neither is better than the other, but they are not equally good. Typically, we will say that one option is better in some ways, and the other in others, but neither is better ‘all things considered’. It is tempting to think that incommensurability is vagueness—that it is (perhaps) indeterminate which is better—but this ‘vagueness view’ of incommensurability has not proven popular. I set out the vagueness view and its implications in more detail, and argue that (...) it can explain most of the puzzling features of incommensurability. This argument proceeds without appeal to John Broome’s ‘collapsing principle’. (shrink)

Scholars have long been aware of striking similarities between a crucial passage in Book II of Plato’s Republic and the longest papyrus fragment surviving from Antiphon’s On Truth. Previous scholarship has identified some views common to both texts but has not explained how these views hang together in a unified and coherent ethical outlook. A deeper investigation into these two texts turns up a blueprint for Greek immoralist arguments, a finding which should be of considerable interest to scholars of ancient (...) Greek ethics and political philosophy. The paper argues that both texts include an argument whose demonstrandum is that it is by nature good or advantageous to commit injustice when one can do so undetected; that this argument in each case involves a set of background premises that constitute a blueprint for immoralist arguments in Classical Athens; and that the immoralist ethical theory of Republic II is an outline distilled from several more detailed theories, including the one belonging to On Truth. (shrink)

The police are required to establish probable cause before engaging in custodial interrogation. Much custodial interrogation relies on a fraudulent epistemic environment (FEE) in which the police knowingly use deception and dishonesty to gain an advantage over a suspect regarding a material issue, injuring the interests of the suspect. Probable cause, then, is a sort of evidentiary and epistemic standard that legally justifies the police’s use of deceptive and dishonest custodial interrogation tactics that are on par with fraud. However, there (...) are both deontological and consequentialist considerations that show why the police’s use of an FEE is often unjustified. Accordingly, the paper argues that even if the use of an FEE is based on probable cause, there are other (non-epistemic) reasons to think evidence with probative value (such as a confession) should be excluded when derived from an FEE and there is no acute threat of harm to others. (shrink)

A "practical discourse" is a collective deliberation organized in such a way as to guarantee optimally unrestrained exchange of arguments; the result should be a decision, e.g. acceptance of a collectively binding norm of action, expressing a rational consensus. Juergen Habermas argues that the choice of entering a "practical discourse" in order to resolve conflict is not arbitrary but is rather "rationally motivated"; speakers of any language whatsoever "unavoidably" share certain normatively binding presuppositions, amongst which is that they expect of (...) one another that they will enter "discourse". ;The present essay is an attempt to test the grounds for the claim that general conditions of communication make "discourse" "unavoidable". It excavates arguments that Habermas rather suggests than explicitly presents, and attempts to give them clear form suitable for critical evaluation. There seem to be about three arguments for his claim: from the nature of "speaking subjects"; from the general conditions of "communicative action"; from the alleged promissory force of illocutions of everyday language. ;Critical evaluation shows that these arguments are insufficient to establish the "thesis of unavoidability". The thesis itself is fatally ambiguous ; the arguments often beg the question. Habermas also fails to distinguish between the project of describing language-use and the project of justifying its rationality for, granting that we had the reciprocal expectations of which he speaks, further argumentation would be required to show that we were rational, let alone moral, for having such expectations. ;Finally, it is determined that Habermas' theory of "communicative action" is itself inconsistent with the project of grounding an obligation to "discourse" in the conditions of "communicative action". According to the latter, obligations must be justified in "discourses"; thus, no argument showing speakers share normative expectations would ipso facto show those expectations are obligatory of "normatively valid". (shrink)

Discussions of extended cognition have increasingly engaged with the empirical and methodological practices of cognitive science and psychology. One topic that has received increased attention from those interested in the extended mind is music cognition. A number of authors have argued that music not only shapes emotional and cognitive processes, but also that it extends those processes beyond the bodily envelope. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the case for extended music cognition. Two accounts are examined in detail: (...) Joel Krueger’s “musically extended emotional mind” and Tom Cochrane’s “expression and extended cognition.” Each account is evaluated using three “anti-extension” arguments. I argue that Krueger and Cochrane’s accounts offer important steps toward extended music cognition, but that each account remains underdeveloped in various ways. To supplement existing approaches, I propose a complementary extended computational approach to music cognition. The claim is that music cognition forms part of an extended system in virtue of involving computational processes that range across environmental and in-the-head elements. The paper concludes by showing how the ECMC deals with each of the three anti-extension challenges and responds to objections. (shrink)

The police are routinely recognized for displaying heroic virtues associated with combat. I take a contrarian position in this paper. Part I begins with the claim that if bravery is to be prioritized in policing, then bravery should be part of the police’s routine roles and responsibilities. However, bravery is not central to what the police do every day, and, therefore, shouldn’t be prioritized (in recruiting, training, and so on). Conversely, Part II claims that if the virtue of honesty is (...) centrally connected to the police role, then it should be prioritized in policing. Because honesty is deeply connected to the police’s routine roles and responsibilities, it should be prioritized. By turning away from misconceptions about the police, the hope is that we will be in a better position to see both the practical and the moral importance of virtue in policing. (shrink)

What are the principles that ground our moral obligations? One obvious answer is that they are prescriptive rules that govern conduct by imposing obligations much like (certain) legal rules govern conduct by imposing legal obligations. This "rule conception of moral principles" merits our attention for at least three reasons. It's the obvious and most straightforward way to develop the analogy between morality and law, and between moral principles and legal rules. It appears to fit some prominent theories of morality and (...) justice (e.g., Brad Hooker's rule-consequentialism, David Gauthier's contractarianism, and John Rawls's contractualism), and thus to possibly derive support from its fit with them. And it promises to account for the ability of moral principles to do the explanatory, counterfactual-supporting, and necessity-grounding work that they do. Moreover, it seems to be an integral part of some prominent theories (e.g., those of Gauthier, Kant, and Christine Korsgaard). However, I will argue that we should reject it. Moreover, by warranting the rejection of an obvious rival, the arguments presented herein strengthen the case for a dispositional (or powers) conception of moral principles, and perhaps for certain other conceptions, as well. (shrink)

“Public Trust in Expert Knowledge: Narrative, Ethics, and Engagement” examines the social, cultural, and ethical ramifications of changing public trust in the expert biomedical knowledge systems of emergent and complex global societies. This symposium was conceived as an interdisciplinary project, drawing on bioethics, the social sciences, and the medical humanities. We settled on public trust as a topic for our work together because its problematization cuts across our fields and substantive research interests. For us, trust is simultaneously a matter of (...) ethics, social relations, and the cultural organization of meaning. We share a commitment to narrative inquiry across our fields of expertise in the bioethics of transformative health technologies, public communications on health threats, and narrative medicine. The contributions to this symposium have applied, in different ways and with different effects, this interdisciplinary mode of inquiry, supplying new reflections on public trust, expertise, and biomedical knowledge. (shrink)

To address what I call the “Uniformity”, “Capriciousness”, and “Reducibility” objections, recent agent-causation theories hold that agent-causation is a type of substance causation. Substance causation consists in substances producing effects by exercising or manifesting their powers. Importantly, these versions of agent-causation assume a realist metaphysics of powers, where powers are properties of substances that can exist unmanifested. However, the realist theories of powers that agent-causal theories have relied upon explicitly hold that powers—rather than their substances—are causes. Substances are merely derivative (...) causes, as the bearers of powers. Critics therefore argue that agent-causation is reducible to causation by the agent’s powers. In this paper, I argue that agent-causation is reducible to causation by the agent’s powers only if powers are self-exemplifying properties. I also offer reasons for why powers—especially agent-causal powers—are non-self-exemplifying properties, in support of the irreducibility of agent-causation. (shrink)

The essay reproduced here is chapter 6 from Death’s Dream Kingdom: The American Psyche since 9-11 . In it, Walter A. Davis provides an analysis of Žižek's Welcome to the Desert of the Real that becomes a critique both of Žižek's general project and the Lacanian theory of the psyche on which it is grounded.

Mealey's sociopathy model is an exemplar of popular diathesis-stress models. Although such models, when presented in descriptive language, offer the illusion of integrative explanation, their actual scientific value is very limited because they fail to make specific, quantitative, falsifiable predictions. Conceptual and quantitative weaknesses of such diathesis-stress models are discussed and the requirements for useful models are outlined.

I argue that the debate between proponents of substance causation and proponents of causation by powers, as to whether substances or their powers are causes, hinges on whether or not powers are self-exemplifying or non-self-exemplifying properties. Substance causation is committed to powers being non-self-exemplifying properties while causation by powers is committed to powers being self-exemplifying properties. I then argue that powers are non-self-exemplifying properties, in support of substance causation.

Throughout his writings Nietzsche suggests that battles waged with and for the benefit of readers and pupils are to take a form analogous to a Greek agon, a contest. The early Nietzsche anticipates a transfiguration of culture that will be brought about by means of agonistic institutions through which greatness will be cultivated in competition. Nietzsche identifies this mode of activity as healthy human striving, as an affirmative way of claiming human meaning, and as a creative process of individual and (...) cultural development that he identifies as Bildung. The free spirit books that Nietzsche writes following The Birth of Tragedy critique the contemporary culture for its paucity of outlets for this kind of activity. ;Nietzsche believed that education, like philosophy, occurs in observing and participating in moments of extraordinary challenge and tension. For him, significant opposition yields strengthened character because it demands active resistance to what one is not and requires the definition of personal style. Encounters with great educators communicate not simply a set of doctrines and theories, they stimulate the activity of self-creation and discovery, of becoming who or, more properly for Nietzsche, what one is. Nietzsche's works reflect a continuous concern with identifying the form of this kind of education. As a philosopher-educator, Nietzsche both exemplifies his own growth through his spiritual and intellectual agones and strives to be a worthy opponent and teacher for his readers. It is this Nietzsche, the philosophos agonistes, the exemplar and educator, that this dissertation describes. (shrink)

In this dissertation I uncover a logic of the development of atomism in early Greek philosophy that has not been previously recognized in the philosophical literature. This logic results from the nature of subjectivity and the attempt by reflective subjects to understand the world in which they live. Thus because of the nature of illusions built in to perception and reflection, reflective subjects who attempt to understand their world will develop more or less accurate accounts according to their ability to (...) see through these illusions. ;Physicalism, as it is understood by Professor Phillip Scribner of The American University and explained in currently unpublished manuscripts, provides the interpretative key that reveals the underlying logic in the development of early Greek philosophy. It is therefore necessary to explain this particular form of physicalism in some detail in order to understand the terminology and categories to be used in the historical analysis. To this end I explain the physicalist ontology and philosophy of science, the genesis of the problem of mind in Modern and Contemporary philosophy, the physicalist solution to the problem of mind, and the nature of the physicalist critique of the history of philosophy. ;In the historical sections the themes of materialism, reductionism, and realism are used to compare the views of Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and Democritus and to show how their various positions on the themes follow from their assumptions about the nature of subjectivity. I argue that the predecessors of atomism were all naive realists and that this assumption about the nature of mind generates the problems of early Greek philosophy. The resolution of these problems follows from the development of critical realism by Leucippus and a form of proto-physicalism by Democritus. ;The main sources used are English translations of Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker by H. Diels, edited by W. Kranz, and a variety of secondary sources which provide the consensus of modern authorities. (shrink)